Abstract: Rumors can be classified into two types, according to whether they can credibly predict impending events or not. The analysis of takeover rumors of publically traded US companies from 1990 to 2008 shows that these two types of rumors can be statistically distinguished by returns of rumored takeover targets before rumor publication.
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Introduction
A financial rumor is an imprecise and unconfirmed message about an impending financial event. Financial markets are full of such rumors. Rumors can be spread through word of mouth or newsletters by insiders such as the senior managers or directors of a company or by outsiders such as investment gurus, professional speculators or financial journalists. In recent years, the internet provides a new forum for rumors, where investors can easily exchange information in chat-rooms, by newsgroups and on message boards.
Because of its nature, not all rumors in financial markets are informative. While some rumormogers might be honest in disseminating their private information, more often rumors are deliberately added noise Pfleiderer, 1986, 1990 ) because most rumormongers intend to mislead or manipulate the market by spreading rumors. Of course, rumors can also be market speculations or predictions based on publically available information. Thus, it is extremely important for an investor who receives a financial rumor to determine whether the rumor conveys a genuine piece of truthful information of the impending event or it is just a false message intending to manipulate the market. It is also vital to know how and to what extent a rumor affects the development of the event and the value of associated financial assets. This paper is motivated to address these issues by analyzing the rumors of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the US market from 1990 to 2008. Our first goal is to assess whether stock markets are efficient at responding to published takeover rumors. Through the data we have collected, we find that although it is impossible to verify whether the context of each rumor is true or false with certainty at the time when the rumor is published, investors in the market can statistically distinguish rumors which correctly 2 predict impending takeover events from those which are simply false alarms by analyzing publically available information such as historical Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the rumored takeover targets. This suggests that the market prices of a target stock can, at least partially, reveal the true information of the potential takeover. However, on the day when a rumor is published and the day after, the abnormal returns of target firms in the group where an M&A rumor is followed by a formal takeover bid announcement are statistically indifferent from those of target firms in the group where an M&A rumor does not lead to any announcement.
1 Moreover, investors can trade on rumors to reap abnormal returns. A simple investment strategy is to buy the stock of the rumored target on the rumor publication day, if the firm's CAR in past 42 or 21 trading days is larger than a threshold and then to hold the position for one calendar year or until a takeover bid for the firm is announced, whichever comes first. Our findings show that there is a quite wide range of the threshold, ranging from zero to 12%, and the investment in the equallyweighted portfolio of selected firms from the sample can earn an annualized excess return of up to 100% or more. These findings are in sharp contrast to the efficient markets hypothesis, even in its semi-strong-form, which states that trading only on public information cannot earn excess returns (Fama, 1970) . Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) argue that the -market is efficient at responding to published takeover rumor‖ as they find that trading on rumors cannot make excess returns. Their trading strategy is buying at the closing price on the day the rumor is published and selling in the open market at the closing price on the ending day which is the earlier of the first formal bid announcement day or one calendar year after the rumor day. A key difference between their strategy and 1 We call the first group rumor-announced group and the second rumor-only group.
3 ours is that they do not distinguish -winners‖ --rumors more likely to be followed by a formal bid from -losers‖ --rumors less likely to lead to a bid. More importantly, even following Pound and Zeckhauser's (1990) investment strategy to hold a long position in all rumored targets in our sample, it still yields an excess return between 42% and 55% per annum. Since selecting winners and/or trading on rumored firms are based on public information, our empirical evidence does not support the efficient markets hypothesis.
The second goal of this paper is to examine the validity of markup pricing in M&A. A well-documented observation in corporate control markets is that bidder firms have to pay substantial premiums to acquire control. A target's stock price usually has an abnormal runup before the first takeover bid announcement and thus markup is defined by the difference between takeover premium and price runup before the first bid. As pointed out by Schwert (1996) , how price runup before the announcement affects the takeover premium can test two competing views of capital markets. The efficient markets view predicts that markup should be independent of runup, since the target firm's stock price rise before takeover bidding reflects the good news about the value of the firm and such a rise should make the bidder to increase the takeover premium by an equal amount. On the other hand, the substitution hypothesis assumes that the bidder's private information is not reflected in the market price before the price runup. Thus, runup and markup are negatively correlated, keeping takeover premium independent of runup. Schwert (1996) is the first study systematically examining the relationship between pre-bid runup of a target's stock price and its post-bid price makeup or the takeover premium. He finds that a 1% increase in the runup of the target's CAR leads to approximately a 1% rise in the total offer premium, supporting the efficient markets view. Because of potential 4 competition among bidders, Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) use initial offer price to measure the initial markup. They find that a 1% rise in runup yields an average increase of 0.8% in the takeover premium implied in the initial offer. It is well recognized that the runup of a target's stock price is likely to be driven by the leaked private information from insiders or legitimate market anticipations (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Schwert, 1996) . Thus, the takeover rumor is largely responsible for the price runup before a bid is formally announced. To pinpoint the impact of rumors, we decompose the runup of a target's abnormal return into two parts: the runup before the takeover rumor is published (pre-runup) and the runup between rumor publication and the announcement of the first bid (post-runup). Consistent with previous studies, our findings show that both pre-runup and post-runup have a significantly positive impact on the takeover premium. Different from these studies, our findings suggest that the impact is much larger in magnitude. In particular, a 1% increase in the pre-runup (post-runup) of a target's CAR results in about a 1.6% (1.2%) increase in takeover premium. There are two potential reasons making our findings different from the previous findings. First, our sample is biased as it only includes takeovers preceded by rumors while the samples of Schwert (1996) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) are much larger and unbiased, including all takeovers. The second difference is that our runup period (pre-runup period plus post-runup period)
varies across takeover targets and on average it is much longer than 42 trading days (about two calendar months), adopted by the aforementioned studies for the runup period. Schwert (1996) finds that CAR starts to rise from 42 trading days before the first bid announcement. However, we find that runups of rumored target stocks have a quite different pattern. Runups in 42 or 21 trading days before the first rumor publication (i.e., 5 pre-runups) are larger than runups between the first rumor publication and first bid announcement (i.e., post-runups, which are on average of 58.6 trading days). Since prerunup also has a more significant marginal effect on takeover premium than post-runup (i.e., 1.6% vs. 1.2% as reported above), we conclude that pre-runup dominates post-runup in their role of increasing takeover premium.
In our analysis, event day is the day when the first takeover rumour is published so that runup period is much longer on average. To be more comparable with previous studies, particularly with Schwert (1996) , this paper also uses the day of the first bid announcement as the event day and adopts the same estimation window and event window as Schwert (1996) to test the markup pricing theory in the competition for corporate control. The results show that markup pricing hypothesis is not consistent with our empirical findings, at least for the successful takeovers. Thus, our findings not only differ from Schwert (1996) as markup pricing does not prevail but also differ from the findings of Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) based on initial offer prices.
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In both theoretical and empirical analyses, the influence of takeover rumors on the stock prices of target firms is well recognized. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find that the -presence of rumors in the news media about an impending bid is the strongest explanatory variable in accounting for unanticipated premiums and prebid runup‖ for 172 tender offers they have studied. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) examine the effects of takeover rumors on the prices of target stocks using a sample of 42 rumors published in 2 However, our findings are, to a certain extent, consistent with the testing results of the markup pricing hypothesis by Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) using CAR over the whole takeover contest period rather than the initial offer price.
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the Heard on the Street column of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) from January 1983 to December 1985. Although target stocks, on average, display significant positive excess returns in 20 trading days before rumor publication, they find that the market reacts to rumors efficiently as trading on rumors is not profitable. Zivney, Bertin and Torabzadeh (1996) extend the study of Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample used in our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate asset prices before rumor publication can statistically identify the type of a rumor but price reactions to the rumor on the day of and the days after rumor publication do not reflect the difference in rumor type. Section 5 tests markup pricing hypothesis and substitution hypothesis based on a sample of rumored takeover bids. Section 6 examines the robustness of our analysis, focusing on the effects of rumor sampling and return selection. The final section concludes the paper.
Data
The stylized timeline of M&A events is illustrated by Figure 1 . Different from previous studies, we decompose runup period into pre-runup period and post-runup period.
We use a window of 42 or 21 trading days before the first rumor publication for the prerunup period while the post-runup period is determined by the observed dates of the first rumor publication and the first bid announcement. The markup period is standard, which is the time between the first bid announcement and delisting or 126 trading days (about a half of a calendar year), whichever comes first. There are 10 and 12 rumors, which have been followed by a formal takeover bid announcement within one and two days, respectively. The impacts of these rumor publications are very likely to be intertwined with the impacts of corresponding takeover announcements. To insure the effect of rumor is not contaminated by takeover announcement, we require that the first rumor publication is separated from the first bid announcement by at least two days. Therefore, these 22 rumors are excluded from the rumor-announced group in our analysis presented in Sections 3-5. However, we have also conducted a parallel analysis with a rumor-announced group which includes these rumors in Section 6 and found not substantial variation to the main results reported in period is the sum of a certain period before rumor publication (42 days or 21 days) and the period between rumor publication and bid announcement, the runup period also varies from one takeover to another. This is quite different from previous studies. 4 The sample size is 188 for the rumor-only group when a 21-day pre-runup period is adopted. 5 We drop these two companies in our analysis below: one has 463 trading days and the other has 680
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
trading days between rumor publication and announcement. Thus, the final sample size for the rumorannounced group in the analysis below is 72 firms.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
There are two competing hypotheses about the sources of takeover rumors. The public speculation hypothesis believes that rumors derive from research by outside experts and monitors, representing market predictions of upcoming events. The alternative hypothesis is that rumors are sourced mainly by leaks from intermediaries involved in M&A negotiation or insiders of associated firms. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) suggest using the duration between the first rumor publication and the first bid announcement to examine these hypotheses. The intuition behind this examination is that insider trading or leaks are often accompanied by immediate takeover announcements while takeovers speculated by the market take a longer period to be materialized. Table 1 can shed some light on this issue and it seems to suggest that a considerable portion of rumors in the rumor-announced sample derive from insider leaks as 36 rumors out of 74 (48.6%) are followed by a formal M&A announcement within only 21 trading days and the median duration from the first rumor publication to the first takeover announcement is 23 trading days.
Can false rumors be picked up?
The focus of this paper is the abnormal return of target firms in M&A. We apply the following market model for each target firm in our sample: (2)
In Table 2a , the first column reports the average CARs of 72 rumor-announced targets in the periods of (-42, -1) to (-3, -1) . It also reports the average abnormal return on the event day, CAR(0, 0), and the average CAR of event day and the first day after the event day, CAR(0, 1). The second column reports their counterparts for 187 rumor-only targets and the third column documents the mean differences of CARs between the two groups. It is obvious that the average CARs of the rumor-announced group are consistently larger than those of rumor-only group for periods from (-42, -1) to (-3, -1). The result of T-test and on Equation (1) to make our analyses directly comparable to these existing studies. For our analysis using raw return, see Section 6.
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Wilcoxon rank-sum test of mean difference in the forth and fifth columns of the table show that the differences are statistically significant for most CARs, particularly for CARs in periods from (-30, -1) to (-14, -1). Thus, although at an individual rumor level an uninformed investor cannot be sure whether or not a takeover rumor will lead to a formal bid at the time when he/she receives the rumor, he/she still can statistically determine the credibility of the rumor by examining the potential target's historical CARs before the rumor publication day. The fact that an investor can use market prices or returns to distinguish rumors suggests the efficiency of the capital market. Accompanying the publication of a takeover rumor, no matter whether it is credible or not, there must be some private or public information about the underlying target. The stock prices of the target seem to be able to correctly incorporate this information and in turn predict the truthfulness of the rumor, at least in statistical sense.
INSERT TABLES 2A AND 2B HERE
To examine the robustness of this finding, we have repeated our analysis by using other time windows. The results are qualitatively similar and we document the results based on the estimation window of (-221, -22) in Table 2b . 8 As can be seen from the table, the most significant mean differences in CARs of the two groups are now in periods from (-21, -1) to (-14, -1), (-12, -1) to (-11, -1) and (-8, 1) to (-6, -1). In sum, market 8 As a comparison, Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) report a CAR(-21, -1) of 7.78%, based on their full sample that includes both materialized and unmaterialized rumors. This figure is between our CAR(-21, -1) of 9.25% for the rumor-announced group and 3.06% for the rumor-only group.
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prices and their movements before the rumor day have the ability to statistically identify a credible rumor from a false one.
The significantly high CARs of stocks in the rumor-announced subsample are not at the expense on bearing higher total risk than stocks in the rumor-only group. To show this point, we have computed each stock's variance of daily returns using daily return observations from day -42 to day -1. The mean of 72 variances from the rumorannounced group is 0.00193 while the mean of 187 variances from the rumor-only group is 0.00198. The T-statistic and Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic for the test of the mean difference are -0.0834 and -0.204, respectively, which confirm that the difference in variances between the two groups is statistically insignificant. 9 Consequently, investment in rumour-announced stocks on average does not bear higher risk than investment in rumor-only stocks.
Because CAR before rumor publication is an important indicator to detect the type of a rumor, it is interesting to investigate the relationship between the CAR of a target firm and the firm's characteristics. If the price movement reflects the market perspectives of the potential deal based on public information such as firm characteristics, CAR should be correlated with these characteristics. A financially distressed firm is more vulnerable and less likely to survive in the competition and thus is more likely to be a takeover target.
We take financial distress as the focus of our investigation. Of course, other firm characteristics can also affect market speculation of takeover and the firm's abnormal 9 For daily returns on day -21 through day -1, the average variances of the two groups are 0.0024 and 0.0023, respectively. T-statistic and Wilcoxon rank-sum statistic for the mean difference tests are 0.0887 and 0.561. Thus, we obtain the same result.
14 return but we include them as control variables in the analysis. More specifically, we examine the effects of firm characteristics by the following model:
where dependent variable CAR i measures target i's cumulative abnormal return of 42 days or 21 days before the rumor publication, Distress i measure the degree of the firm's financial risk and Control r,i represents a set of firm-level control variables. We use two measures for a firm's financial distress level and bankruptcy probability in the short run: Altman's Z-score 10 (Altman, 1968) and multiple-choice
Zmijewski probit model 11 (Zmijewski, 1984) . A higher Z-score or a lower Zmijewski probability means that the company is financially healthier in comparison to a lower score or a higher probability. Distress variable in (3) uses annual data, which is the Z-score or Zmijewski probability of a target firm in the year immediately before the event date. In control variables, firm leverage (Leverage) is measured as total debt divided by the sum of market value of equity and total debt, and firm size (Firm Size) is measured as the logarithm of market value of equity. Since there are quarterly data on these variables, their observations in the quarter immediately before the event date are used in regression (3). The third control variable is sales growth (Sales Growth) of the target firm, which is the average growth rate for the four-quarter period just before the rumor publication. separately to see whether there is any difference between the two groups. Table 3 documents the descriptive statistics of dependent variable and explanatory variables of (3). The two subsamples of rumor-announced and rumor-only firms are quite similar in terms of financial leverage, firm size and sales growth. Of our main interestfinancial distress, the two groups are quite similar in the measure of Zmijewski probability. However, the sample mean of Altman's Z-score of the rumor-announced group is much larger than the rumor-only group. This is due to a couple of outliers in the rumor-announced group. These firms have a Z-score of more than 100. Indeed, the median Z-scores of the two subsamples have no substantial difference.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The results of the OLS regression of model (3) are reported in include all control variables in the regression. The first observation from Table 4 is that the impact of financial distress on CAR is consistent across all models, sample groups and dependent variable choices. The coefficients of Distress i show that for firms in the rumor-announced group, an increase in financial distress (a fall in Z-score or a rise in Zmijewski probability) leads to a greater CAR. However, the signs of the coefficients of Distress i for the firms in the rumor-only group are just opposite to their counterparts of rumor-announced group, which implies that an increase in financial distress of a rumoronly firm leads to a lower CAR. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that although there are various sources and transmission networks of takeover rumors, investors in the market can still utilize some publicly observable variables such as financial distress in the pre-runup period to judge a firm's possibility of being a takeover target. A financially sound firm is less likely to become a takeover target, so that a marginal deterioration of its financial position does not trigger a stock price rise resulted from takeover speculation. In contrast, for a financially distressed firm, a similar marginal deterioration is likely to increase the likelihood of takeover and, in turn, its stock price rises rather than falls. The impact of Distress i is significant in most scenarios as evidenced that only 4 out 16 of its coefficients are statistically indifferent from zero based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980) . However, the effects of control variables are mostly insignificant. An exception is Firm Size. When the dependent variable is CAR i (-21, -1), it is negatively and significantly affects CAR i of both rumor-announced and rumor-only targets.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Does the market respond to takeover rumors efficiently?
Although market prices are able to statistically predict whether a takeover rumor is true or false, the puzzle is that such a prediction has not been utilized by investors in the market. Takeover is usually considered as good news for investing in the target firm and the market usually responds positively to an M&A announcement. 12 Such a positive effect is also reflected in the surge of stock prices in our sampled targets on the rumor day and the day after the rumor publication, as shown by CAR(0, 0) and CAR(0, 1) in the Tables 2a and 2b , 13 because the investors anticipate the impending takeover bids. Since the takeover rumors of the targets in the rumor-only group are false and the market can statistically identify such rumors, their stock price increases should be smaller than their counterparts in the rumor-announced group if the market is efficient. Although the sample mean of rumor day abnormal return, CAR(0, 0), of the rumor-announced group is greater than its counterpart of the rumor-only group (i.e., 0.0538 vs. 0.0495 in Table 2a ), the two-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(0, 1), of the rumor-announced group is actually smaller than its counterpart of the rumor-only group (i.e., 0.0635 vs. 0.0669 in Table 2a ). Moreover, both T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test show that the differences 12 Substantial increases in target firm's stock prices before and after takeover announcements have been well documented. See, for example, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) , Jensen and Ruback (1983) , and Keown and Pinkerton (1981) . 13 This observation is noticeably different from Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) who find that no significant excess returns occur on the rumor publication day while the volatility of excess returns on that day is high.
More specifically, they report a mean excess return and standard deviation of 0.07% and 4.19%, respectively.
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of these sample means are statistically indifferent from zero. In other words, investors respond indifferently, on the event day and the day after, to these statistically distinguishable rumors. This casts a serious doubt on the efficiency of stock markets.
The market prices seem not to efficiently reflect the information available to the public when takeover rumors appear in the WSJ and/or other media. This conclusion is robust as we have estimated CAR(0, 0) and CAR(0, 1) with other estimation windows but obtained qualitatively similar results. For instance, Table 2b reports the estimations based on the window of (-221, -22) . The CAR(0, 0) of the rumor-announced group is 0.0538, which is greater than the CAR(0, 0) of the rumor-only group, 0.0488. For CAR(0, 1), it is 0.0655 vs. 0.0659. The differences between these two sets of sample means are statistically indifferent.
To demonstrate further market inefficiency, we show that there is a simple investment strategy which ensures an investor a statistically significant excess return by trading on takeover rumors. This strategy is to buy rumored stocks which are more likely to be followed by a takeover bid. It involves picking a certain threshold such that an investor buys a dollar worth of the rumored stock at the closing price on the rumor day if the firm's CAR in past 42 or 21 days is greater than the threshold and then holds the position until the first takeover bid is announced or for 252 trading days (one calendar year), whichever comes first. But the investor takes no action if the firm's CAR is below the chosen threshold. The outcome of the investment strategy is documented in Table 5 below. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) suggest another trading strategy of buying all rumored target stocks on the day of rumor publication and holding them until the first bid or for a calendar year, whichever comes first. Given that such trading strategy cannot yield statistically significant excess returns for their sampled firms, they conclude that the market is efficient because trading on rumor is not profitable. There are two substantial differences between our approach/findings and those of Pound and Zeckhauser's. First, their investment strategy does not utilize publically available price information to determine which rumored targets to buy. Our investment strategy uses this price information but not other private or public information at all and it is still profitable.
Second, perhaps more surprisingly, even following Pound and Zeckhauser's investment strategy and long all rumored target firms in our sample, investors can still earn excessive profits. As shown in the last rows of Panels A and B of Table 5 , such an investment strategy yields annualized excess returns ranging from 41.9% to 54.5%. They are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. There are only 42 target firms in the Pound-Zeckhauser sample, which is much smaller than our samples of 223 to 260 firms.
Moreover, Pound and Zeckhauser's (1990) sample period is from January 1, 1983 through December 31, 1985 while ours covers a more recent and longer period, from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 2008. The divergence in sample size and sample period is likely to be the reasons for the disparity in investment outcomes.
It is also interested to compare the risk of investing in the winner stocks with that of loser stocks. The column, Average variance, in Table 5 compiles the average of annualized variances of the daily returns of invested stocks over the investment periods.
Obviously, for each pair of winner set and loser set, the former has a much smaller average variance. This is not surprising. Most winner stocks experience a small and stable gain between rumor day and delisting while most loser stocks experience a large loss over a period a few days after rumor publication. It is also worth noting that investing in winner stocks does not bear very high total risk as the average variances falls in a range of 0.018 to 0.050. In comparison, the average annualized variance of the CRSP market portfolio is 0.0308 over the period of 1990-2008.
Do bidders markup price?
An implication of efficient markets is that the stock price movement of a target firm, before takeover bidding, reveals its value changes unknown to bidders. Since the markup of a takeover bid represents the bidder's willingness to pay for the impending takeover, a one-dollar increase in the target's stock price in the runup period should on average result in a one-dollar rise in the takeover premium according to the view of efficient markets. A contrasting view is that runup is not caused by new information.
Because the runup merely reflects the anticipation of a planned takeover premium, the offer premium should be independent of runup. By definition, premium equals the sum of runup and markup, this view implies a perfect substitution hypothesis that any increase in runup will be eased by a decline in markup leaving the premium unchanged. We revisit this issue of relationship between runup and takeover premium using our newly collected 22 data. But departing from the conventional analysis, we decompose runup into pre-runup and post-runup to better understand the effects of rumor on takeover premium. The prerunup of target i is calculated using its CAR between day -42 (or -21) to day -1, i.e.:
The post-runup is the CAR in the post-runup period so that it can be calculated by:
where T is the date of the first bid announcement. The definition of markup is conventional, which is the CAR from the day of the first bid announcement through delisting or 126 trading days, whichever comes first:
The total premium, Premium i , paid by a successful bidder is the sum of Pre-runup i , Postrunup i and Markup i . 16 There are 60 out of 72 rumor-announced firms which have been taken over in the end of the takeover process and we classify them into the successful sample. To distinguish from it, we call the sample of all 72 rumor-announced firms the rumor-announced sample. Panels A and B in Table 6 report the descriptive statistics of pre-runup, post-runup, runup, markup and premium calculated based on an estimation window of (-242, -42) of these two samples, respectively, while Panels C and D report the same items based on the (-221, -22) window. 16 To be comparable with the existing literature, the -premiums‖ of unsuccessful takeover are also included, and it is defined as by the sum of Pre-runup, Post-runup and Markup too.
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Previous studies find that runup is usually more substantial at the time when it is closer to the first bid announcement. 17 Table 6 shows a quite different runup pattern. For both 42-or 21-day pre-runup periods, pre-runup on average dominates post-runup. Since the average length of post-runup periods is around 58.6 trading days, such dominance is not due to a shorter post-runup period. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean of post-runup is zero. Therefore, the main runup of the target's stock price occurs in the pre-runup period rather than post-runup period although the latter is closer to the takeover bid announcement than the former.
The average markups documented in the table are negative under various scenarios although they are not significantly different from zero. The negative markup is consistent with an initial overreaction of the market to the takeover rumors and then the market and/or bidders correct the overreaction in bidding or consecutive trading. In other words, instead of marking up, bidders actually mark down from runups in their offers on average. This is particularly obvious by comparing the successful subsample with the rumor-announced sample, in that the former has a larger markdown than the latter. To investigate the effect of a change of runup on the changes of premium and markup we, following Schwert (1996) , consider a regression model that:
This regression difference from Schwert (1996) by decomposing Runup into Pre-runup
and Post-runup. 18 The results of the regressions are reported in Table 7 Table 6 shows that the size of Pre-runup is much larger than that of Postrunup on average. Thus, pre-runup not only dominates post-runup in terms of marginal effect on takeover premium since 2 1 b b  , but also in terms of the overall impact on takeover premium.
INSERT TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE
To examine markup pricing hypothesis further, we study a regression model that is exactly the same as Schwert (1996) :
The results in Panels A and B of Table 8 are the regression outcomes using the rumorannounced sample and the successful subsample, respectively. They demonstrate that the null hypothesis of b = 1 can be strongly rejected in 3 out of 4 scenarios using the heteroskedasticity-consistent T-statistics. Thus, we have strong empirical evidence 18 A test shows that the correlation between pre-runup and post-runup is statistically insignificant. There are two potential reasons making our results different from those of previous studies. First, we focus on M&A deals preceded by relevant rumors while the samples of Schwert (1996) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) include all target firms which are publicly traded in the U.S. Their sample sizes are much larger than ours.
As a result the impact of takeover rumors discovered by this paper might have been eased by price dynamics of other target firms in their samples over the runup period. The second reason relates to the duration of runup period. Our runup period is much longer than a 42-day period used by Schwert (1996) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) .
Our runup period equal to 42 or 21 days of pre-runup period plus an average post-runup period of 58.6 days, leading to an average runup period of 100.6 or 79.6 days.
19 Their runup is measured in a similar way so that market risk has not been removed from markup and runup. However, they also use a market model similar to equation (1) to estimate CAR in the runup period and markup period, which implies an estimate of b of 1.595 based on their full sample and 1.493 based on their successful sample. These estimates are closer to these reported in Panels A and B of Table 8 .
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To address the second difference, we re-run model (8) with a runup period of 42 days, irrespective of the different lengths of actual post-runup periods. More specifically, we choose the first bid announcement day as the event day, similar to Schwert (1996) , and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) . The estimation period starts from days -379 and ends on day -127 and the runup is the CAR over day -42 to day -1 (before the first bid announcement). The markup is the CAR from the first bid announcement through delisting or 126 trading days after the first bid, whichever comes first. We deliberately choose estimation window, runup period and markup period in this way so that they are the same as those adopted by Schwert (1996) . The descriptive statistics of runup, markup and takeover premium under this specification are presented in Table 9 , where Panel A includes all rumor-announced firms and Panel B includes only targets which have been successfully taken over. 20 The average CARs of all rumor-announced firms from day -126 to day 252 are illustrated in Figure 2 . A notable difference of Table 9 from the statistics in Table 6 is that the mean markups are now positive rather than negative, 20 The samples are two firms smaller than their counterparts in Panels A and B of Table 6 because of data unavailability.
INSERT TABLE 9 AND FIGURE 2 HERE
The regression results of using takeover bid announcement as the event are
reported in Panel C of Table 8 More importantly, the hypothesis of b ≤ 1 can be rejected for our successful sample whilst the hypothesis of b = 1 cannot be rejected for our rumor-announced sample. In sum, our findings reject substitution hypothesis and cannot be fully explained by the markup pricing theory, at least for the successful sample. The difference between our finding and those of previous studies, Schwert's (1996) in particular, indicates that the very existence of M&A rumors can have some material impact on the bidders' pricing strategies and the final realizations of takeover premiums.
The super-markup pricing (b > 1), found in this study, is consistent with the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) , in that bidders are interested in winning a takeover contest irrespective of costs. However, it can also be explained by reevaluating the synergy of the merger and/or redistributing the gain of the merger in the takeover contest between the 28 target and bidder firms. Testing these hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper and remains for future studies.
Further robustness examinations
To ensure our findings are robust, we have conducted various robustness checks.
In addition to what have reported in the above analysis, we briefly report and discuss in this section the results of adopting alternative sampling of rumor-announced group and using raw returns rather than abnormal returns for our analysis.
Alternative sampling of rumor-announced group
As mentioned in Section 2, we required in the above analysis that the first rumor publication and the first bid announcement are separated by two days to isolate rumor publication effects from bid announcement effects. Thus, we have dropped 22 targets from the rumor-announced group as 10 of them have attracted a takeover bid within one day of rumor publication and the other 12 targets attracted a bid within two days. Adding these 12 or 22 targets back into the rumor-announced group does not change the main findings reported in the previous sections. We summarize the results of using this alternative sampling below.
First and obviously, if the 12 targets (or 22 targets) are included in the sample, the number of observed targets with less than 21 trading days between rumor publication and bid announcement increases from 36 in Table 1 to 48 (or 58). In terms of percentage, the increase is from 48.6% to 55.8% (or 60.4%). The average length and median length of the time interval between rumor publication and bid announcement are reduced from 58. Table   2b are 0.0102 (or 0.0154) and 0.0082. All these mean differences are statistically insignificant.
21 Note, CAR(0, 1) cannot be used to measure the market response to rumor if the rumor-announced group includes targets whose bid is announced within one day of rumor publication because CAR(0, 1) includes abnormal return on announcement day, which is the major part of markup.
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Forth, the investment strategy specified in Section 4 still yields substantial excess returns. For instance, corresponding to Panel A of Investing in all rumored targets yields an annualized excess return of 93% (or 122%).
Obviously, these results are stronger than what are documented in Panel A of Table 5 . A similar conclusion can be drawn for Panel B. The reason for higher excess returns of the investment strategy by adding these targets into the sample is that rumor publication day and the day after usually have a very high excess return. Thus, adding these targets not only enlarges the amount of winner stocks but also provides an opportunity for investors to hold very high returns for a very short period (i.e., one or two days).
Fifth, the regression outcomes of models (7) and (8) In sum, the main findings of this paper are robust to the sample selection of the rumor-announced group. 31
Analysis with raw returns
The choice of return is critical to our analysis. Instead of abnormal returns, we have also used raw return data to repeat the analysis conducted in Section 3 through Tables 2a and 2b . For instance, corresponding to Table 2a , almost all differences of CRR(-42, -1) through CRR (-14,-1 ) are significant at the 1% level by both T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, and corresponding to Table 2b almost all differences of CRR(-21, -1) through CRR (-14,-1 ) are significant at the 1% level. Based on CRR(41, 1) or CRR(21, 1) to select winner stocks, the winner stocks on average perform better than the loser stocks gauged by raw returns after rumor publication. The results similar to Table 5 are obtained when CAR is replaced by CRR. However, using CRR i to run regressions (7) and (8) lead to somewhat different estimates than using CARs. For instance, the estimates of b 1 are smaller than their counterparts in Table 7 while the estimates of b 2 are larger. Nevertheless, the estimates of b, based on the successful subsample, are quite consistent with their counterparts in Table 8 and are significantly greater than one.
Following the process of Subsection 6.1, we then add back the 22 targets, whose first merger announcement day are within two days of the first rumor publication day, 22 See, for instance, McConnell and Sanger (1987) , and Jaffe and Mahoney (1999) for the adoption of raw returns.
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into the sample and repeat the above analysis process of testing CRRs. Moreover, there are 5 rumor-announced targets and 14 rumor-only targets, which have no sufficient CAR data but complete data of CRR. We add these 19 firms into the sample further and duplicate the analysis process again. All three different samples yield quite consistent results.
Conclusions
Using the data of M&A rumors of publicly traded US target firms, we find quite contradicting evidences regarding capital markets efficiency. On the one hand, stock prices of these rumored firms before rumor publication can be used to statistically distinguish a genuine prediction of takeover from a false alarm, indicating that prices largely assemble and reflect market information. On the other hand, the market participants do not seem to fully utilize the information and leaves some profitable opportunities unexplored. In addition, price runups in our sample seem to appear earlier than what are reported in previous studies. Pre-rumor runups dominate post-rumor runups not only in their magnitudes but also in the marginal effect on takeover premiums.
Markup pricing hypothesis can be rejected for rumored M&A deals, if the runup period is extended to 42 days before rumor publication. Even with a standard runup period of 42 days before the first bid announcement, markup pricing hypothesis still cannot fully explain the empirical evidence documented in this paper. The competing substitution hypothesis of takeover premiums is also strongly rejected by our empirical evidence, irrespective of the choice of the length of runup period. How to resolve the puzzling findings of this paper , both theoretically and empirically, remains for future research. -114  -108  -102  -96  -90  -84  -78  -72  -66  -60  -54  -48  -42  -36  -30  -24  -18  -12  -6  0  6  12  18  24  30  36  42  48  54  60  66  72  78  84  90  96  102  108  114  120  126  132  138  144  150  156  162  168  174  180  186  192  198  204  210  216  222  228  234  240  246 , where market index is the CRSP valueweighted market portfolio. The regression of the market model uses daily returns from day -379 to day -127. The event day, day 0, is the day when the first formal bid is announced.
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Table 2a
Average CARs of rumor-announced and rumor-only targets and their differences, estimation based on time series between (-242,-43).
Event day (day 0) is the day when the takeover rumor is published for the first time. Using the daily return data of target i from CRSP and daily returns of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio over (-242,-43) , coefficients α i and β i are estimated by the following market model:
Then the estimated α i and β i are substituted into the model to calculate the abnormal return, it  , over (-42, -1), using the observations of daily returns of target i and the CRSP market portfolio over this period. The CAR of firm i between dates t 1 and t 2 is given by:
There are 72 rumor-announced firms and 187 rumor-only firms in the sample. The first column reports the average CARs of rumor-announced firms in the periods of (-42, -1) to (-3, -1), the average abnormal return on the event day, CAR(0, 0), and the average CAR of event day and the first day after the event day, CAR(0, 1). The second column reports their counterparts for the rumor-only group and the third column documents the differences between the two groups. The results of T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test of mean difference are reported in the forth and fifth columns, respectively. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Table 2b
Average CARs of rumor-announced and rumor-only targets and their differences, estimation based on time series between (-221,-22).
The estimation process for CAR is the same as Table 2a except for using an estimation window of (-221,-22) . There are 72 rumor-announced firms and 188 rumor-only firms in the sample. The first column reports the average CARs of rumor-announced targets in the periods of (-21, -1) to (-3, -1), (0, 0) and (0, 1). The second column reports their counterparts for the rumor-only group and the third column documents the differences between the two groups. The results of T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test of mean difference are reported in the forth and fifth columns, respectively. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
CAR
Rumor Tables 2a and 2b . The statistics of firm characteristics are calculated using data from Compustat from 1990 to 2008. Altman's Z-score is calculated by formula Z = 1.2  (Working capital / Total assets) + 1.4  (Retained earnings / Total assets) + 3.3 (Earnings before interest and taxes /Total assets) + 0.6  (Market value of equity /Book value of total liabilities) + 0.999  (Sales / Total assets). Zmijewski Probability of bankruptcy is measured by the cumulative probability of the standard normal distribution at point X, where X = −4.3 -4.5  (Net income/ Total assets) + 5.7  (Total liabilities / Total assets) − 0.004  (Current assets /Current liabilities). Both Altman Z-score and Zmijewski Probability use the annual data of the year immediately before rumor publication. Leverage is measured as total debt divided by the sum of market value of equity and total debt, Firm Size is the logarithm of market value of equity. These two variables use quarterly observations in the quarter just before the event date. Sales Growth is the average growth rate of sales of the four quarters just before the rumor publication. Table 5 Investment outcomes of buying and holding the selected target stocks. This table reports the outcomes of investment in the selected target stocks whose CARs in day -42 to day -1 or in day -21 to day -1 are greater than (i.e., winner stocks) or smaller than (i.e., loser stocks) a particular threshold. The outcomes of investing in all rumored targets are also reported in the end of each panel. In Panel A, stocks are selected from a sample of rumor-announced firms and rumor-only firms which have data for at least 252 trading days after rumor publication. Stocks in Panel B are selected from the sample of all rumor-announced firms and rumor-only firms. Selected stocks are bought at the closing price on the rumor day and then are sold in the open market on the day when the first takeover bid is announced or 252 trading days after the rumor day, whichever comes first. The column of Excess return shows the annualized excess returns of the investment profiles with their standard deviations in parentheses. The significance levels of excess returns are reported by statistics of T-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The column of Average variance documents the average of the annualized variances of daily returns of invested stocks. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Table 6 Descriptive statistics of pre-runup, post-runup, runup, markup and takeover premium. Pre-runup i is equal to the CAR of target i's stock from day -42 to day -1 (or day -21 to day -1). Post-runup i is target i's CAR from the day of the first rumor publication through the day before the first bid announcement. Runup i is the sum of Pre-runup i and Post-runup i . Markup i is the CAR from the day of the first bid announcement through delisting or 126 trading days, whichever comes first. Premium i is the sum of Runup i and Markup i . Panels A and B report the descriptive statistics of the rumor-announced sample and the successful sample, respectively, using an estimation window of (-242, -43) to estimate excess returns and using CAR i (-42, -1) for Pre-runup i . Panels C and D report the same items but using an estimation window of (-221, -22) Pre-runup i is measured by the CAR of target i's stock from day -42 to day -1 in Panel A and from day -21 to day -1 in Panel B. Post-runup i is the CAR from the day of the first rumor date through the day before the first bid announcement. Markup i is the CAR from the day of the first bid announcement through delisting or 126 trading days, whichever comes first. Each panel includes a sample of all rumor-announced targets and a sample of targets being successfully taken over. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 0) is the day when the rumor is published first time and Runup i is the sum of Pre-runup i and Post-runup i , where Pre-runup i is the CAR of target i's stock from day -42 to day -1 in Panel A and from day -21 to day -1 in Panel B, and Post-runup i is the CAR from the event day through the day before the first bid announcement. In panel C, day 0 is the day when the first bid is announced and Runup i is measured by the CAR of target i's stock from day -42 to day -1. Markup i in all three panels is the CAR from the day of the first bid announcement through delisting or 126 trading days, whichever comes first. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
Sample
Sample Table 9 Descriptive statistics of the runup, markup and takeover premium when event day is the first bid announcement day. Event day is the day when the first bid is announced. Estimation window extends from day -379 to day -127. Runup i is equal to the CAR of target i's stock from day -42 to day -1. Markup i is the CAR from the event day through delisting or 126 trading days, whichever comes first. Premium i is the sum of Runup i and Markup i . Panels A and B report the descriptive statistics of the rumor-announced sample and the successful sample, respectively. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
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